Two types of thinking about action in philosophy

In Philosophy of Action we can differentiate (at least) between two very different ways of thinking about what types of actions there are:
I) One way would be a metaphysically/ontologically minded way. If we approach actions in this way we will try to see how they fit into the larger framework of the basic constituent categories of reality. We are trying to carve reality at the joints. One could then for example defend that all actions are instances of an agents' causing a(n intrinsic) result [e.g. Bach 1980, Alvarez & Hyman 1998]. Or one could defend the view that all actions are events [e.g. Davidson 1980, Goldman 1970, etc.]. Or that they are processes [e.g. Stout 2005]. Of course the plausibility of such views will depend on what one's view of instances of causing, events, or processes is, and how that fits what we know about actions, and what according to the view defended we should think about them. And of course one does not have to be a monist about such matters. One can be a pluralist and think that some actions belong into one of these categories, while others into another, and again further actions into the third one.
II) Another way of thinking about what types of actions there are could be called a moral/ethical/normative way. If one takes this approach it is possible to distinguish between 'voluntary', 'involuntary', 'non-voluntary', and 'intentional' actions [e.g. Anscombe 1963/2000, Bratman 1987, Frankfurt 1988, Hyman 2015].


There are of course more common ways of thinking about types of actions. For example we normally in our everyday lives and proceedings distinguish between drinking, brushing out teeth, and reading the news. These can all be treated as actions, an the differences between them are plenty of practical importance to us. The dentist rarely asks anyone to read the news more frequently and for at least tree minutes every time, nor does drinking help much with being well informed.