Showing posts with label value. Show all posts
Showing posts with label value. Show all posts

Friday, 29 April 2016

The Shepherd's Life

The Shepherd's Life has been a hit book in Britain. James Rebanks wrote an interesting and compelling account both of what it is like to be a shepherd, and of why it is okay to choose to continue a tradition. Rebanks isn't into high  level politics. He is into the very personal and moral sphere of life, the sphere in which we seek our happiness, fulfillment, our calling, and try to construct a life that has meaning and value for us, and for others. And he is very good at this, even remarkably so.

There are many debates in contemporary philosophy concerning values, meaning, the good, and the meaning of life. I think Rebanks's position is closest to those who claim that value is created, not found. Reading his account of how natural it was for him to continue what his grandfather and father have been doing reminded me of Samuel Scheffler's book Death and the Afterlife, in which Scheffler argued that many of our standard activities - work, learning, healing, saving, and building houses for example - only make sense because we believe that others will engage in the same ways of life which we live and value, and imagine to go on. In a sense of course Scheffler's point is obvious: how could we imagine what it will be like to live in, for example the EU or India in 200 years? Naturally, we imagine that despite all the inevitable technological, political, economical, and fashion-related changes there will be core elements of life such as the ways families live (together or separately, close or far, etc.) or the way we treat individuals (with respect, with demands, with empathy, etc.) which will be similar to ours.

Rebanks makes a good case for the position that it is possible and should be seen as a respectable option to say no to the current ideal of striving for a career in management, finance, business, law or something else that earns big money and is done in a busy city. The alternative he highlights is that of carrying on with something that is working, keeping things going, and adopting to changes when that is important, without discarding a whole way of life just because other options seem to be easier or more lucrative at the moment.

As someone who is/has making/made the attempt to become the first academic in my family, and doing so in the UK, not in my home country, not somewhere where my own language is spoken, away from my family and childhood friends, this message awakes interest. Maybe I should have taken on the low salaries at a Hungarian university - way below EU average and even more below UK average - and struggled with paying the rent but fulfilled a role in that society? On the other hand I know that the answer is clearly no. The option that Rebanks depicts is only open as long as one has a comfortable enough life to go on. Being a shepherd comes across as fantastic. And it must be. It must also be rewarding, and hard work. It also has a function and it is valuable. But such choices are only viable as long as they provide the basics. When the shepherd's life will change to be more like the miner's in the UK, no one will write books like this anymore.

This is not to say that Rebanks isn't right. As long as the option of living such a life is a meaningful - and not a harmful - option, it should be fine for people to resist the pressure of uniform careers and dreams. Still, this can't be done when need and poverty kick in. It can't be done in 90% of the world right now. Hence I'm of two minds about the book. I applaud the sentiment and there is a message with which I heartily agree. On the other hand, I think everyone reading the book has to be careful not to mistake it for an argument for going back to old professions or to stay where she is at. We should consider keeping traditions going as long as they provide lives worth living for us and our communities, but not beyond that. We need to be able to put up with change when we have to. Hence, the book should be considered as a particular story about a group of shepherd's in one region of the UK, and nothing more.

Just a minor update at the end: Some people might read my review and not recognize the book they've read or get the impression that The Shepherd's Life is a philosophy book. It is not. It is a lucidly written, entertaining, emotional, informative and imaginative journey through the family life, community, work, and landscape that frame shepherding. And of course there are the sheep and the herding dogs. Lovely stories, great characters, all written in an easy to follow and pleasant way. I warmly recommend it.

Monday, 7 October 2013

A little puzzle: the present and the future you, and their conflicting interests

Imagine that you have some character trait that you feel you would be better off without. Imagine also, that you lack some trait you would be happy to have. If you now make certain decisions and commit yourself to them in due time you can, with good chance, achieve to become the sort of person you want to be.
But what if the person you become does not enjoy being the way she is? What if she finds some of her traits bothersome? Of she thinks others find it irritating that she is the way she is and maybe that's why she feels lonely. Maybe she should change...

The problem emerging from this scenario is the following one: if you value certain character traits now and manage to become the sort of person who has them, your scale of values and their ranking might change enough to make some of the values you have at this point seem worthless in your eyes. That is, there does not seem to be any chance to make yourself still feel attracted to the vision about what sort of person it would be nice to be, that you had earlier.

Is this the same type of problem that Jon Elster discusses, for example in his Ulysses Unbound? Not exactly. There, Elster is primarily focusing on how you can stay committed to a goal, when you know all along that the goal is good. For example, how an alcoholic can stick to his resolution not to drink, although he knows he will want a drink very badly when he gets home after work. The difference between this case and the case I mentioned above is, that the scenarios Elster discusses take it for granted that you know what the right is. You just need to stick to it somehow - you need to avoid temptation, temporal effects of scaling, etc. But you do not face an entirely new set of values. You just get into a situation where you temporarily value the bad thing. The changing-personality scenario is different. It portrays the possibility of a good change which you find meaningless once achieved. This type of problem has a pair in the field of decision making general (not constrained to altering your own personality). 

There is an argument, made by L. A. Paul, in an article in preparation, in connection with having children, according to which no matter what you think now about having kids, that does not really matter. Actually having them is such a life changing experience, that you cannot now put yourself into the place of the person you will be after you already have kids. So, those problems that you might see with having kids are not sure to still be there once you have them. (Of course no one is saying that they might not, or that they disappear without a trace. But your priorities change.) Also, the good parts of having kids might be entirely different than what you expect. And this is just partly an issue of access to information about what it means to have a kid: you can get to know a lot by talking with your parents, relatives and friends, by working with kids, by reading about them, and so on. The information you do not have access to is this: what sort of person you will become. You might be surprised by finding joy in some things you would never have expected. Also, since what we care for influences the way we focus our attention and what we spend time on, you might find that you notice things about kids which you would never have done if you would have stayed your earlier self.

So, why is all this a problem? As Paul suggests, sometimes we need to be a bit crazy and make these decisions. One cannot find out sooner. Well, this might be true of having kids. But what about cases when for example teenagers are supposed to make choices about the job they choose? Or when it is left to politicians to decide about education? Or when one follows some self-help book for successful managers, and accepts its values and sets out to become like suggested? What do we base these decisions on?
There are two risks of making bad decisions in such situations: one is when we get to the point that we have changed, but we become a sort of person who does not care about being like that anymore. The other is that we misjudge what being that sort of person will be like: we thought we would be better, kinder, more courageous and just. But in fact we turn out worse and we don't even mind it anymore. We enjoy ourselves and the measure of what's a good life and a good person is gone.
It seems that in all these situations we cannot rely on anything else than on the experience and advice of those who have gone through changes we are thinking about undergoing. But we have to take into account that they are quite probably not able to occupy once more their perspective from before the change. Another thing that might be helpful is to have an objective value  scale, which is sufficiently independent of our character to hold in place, no matter how our changes turn out to be. Having such a scale of values can help us orient ourselves even if the metamorphosis is a bad one. (Poor Kafka, he saw how many of his contemporaries by becoming 'bugs' adopt to their sad and constrained jobs which do not provide them with any sort of feeling of usefulness and pride in their work.)

I cannot end this post with any more particular suggestions. But I'm more than curious to read what you think, what you recommend me to read and how you handle such problems.

Sunday, 6 October 2013

On the role, usefulness and value of the humanities

When one studies a subject in the humanities or works in any of its fields one can often encounter complaints from students and even from professionals that the humanities are useless and it does not make sense to learn or practice them.

Most of these complaints come from students in other fields. Accordingly, the source of their complaints is probably that they don't know what one could be working on in the humanities. They have no knowledge of what is studied, how it is studied, what one working as a professional in the humanities does, how this relates to society and whether it is useful or not. Their ignorance and intolerant attitudes can usually be dispelled quite easily if one spends a few minutes explaining what they don't know.

The problem is worse if one encounters serious grown ups voicing such concerns. A few years ago in one of his books for wider audiences Stephen Hawking pushed that the job philosophy did earlier is now entirely taken over by science and therefore we should stop doing philosophy. Hawking is surely a great physicist but we should treat his claims regarding other fields with due suspicion. Of course they can be right, it is just that he is not a professional on education, on teaching or on research, but on physics. Thus we should require a bit more detailed information and argument before we accept big - and superficial - words.

Another instance of condemning the humanities occurred just recently in Hungary. The leading party, Fidesz, is in a governing-frenzy. The country's economic situation is bad, Fidesz enjoys two-thirds majority in the parliament, that is they can pass any law they want, and accordingly they try to reform everything. The under-secretary responsible for higher education, István Klinghammer, voiced the view in an interview with him that "In today's world it is the natural sciences and the mechanical sciences are producing value. The humanities, and culture, are very important, but they do not produce values, they give people delight and  enjoyment."

Are such views justified?

There might be many reasons why they aren't. First, there is an organization trying to test whether teaching philosophy in primary schools helps kids develop better skills, needed both for science and humanities related subjects, but of course also beyond school subjects - such as when reading news, instructions, contracts. According to some studies on the effect of their classes critical thinking group-games, with philosophy related material, can lead to such development. They also recently argued for this publicly.

Another function philosophy and other fields of humanities serve is one of being information sources that can shape decision making well. This happens on three levels: first, we all learn the basics of literature, history, the structures found in society throughout school. This shapes both our identities, our notion of what sort of beings we are and what has happened to communities of humans before our birth. An adequate preparation of this sort can help people spot dangers and threats, both on the personal and the community level, thereby guarding them against making immoral judgments, accepting very bad choices from their representatives, and so on. Second, keeping track of good and bad decisions, of different types of states and their relations, on how people conducted themselves and what good and bad effect that had (on their psychology, personal happiness, groups, economy, etc.) is important, both in order to avoid similar pitfalls, and in order to get good ideas for solving problems. Third, many practical questions touch on the lives of individuals, on the lives of communities, nations, institutions. If these questions are to be answered well, they need to be informed by data about how the individuals and the groups behave, what they are, what they value. It is not much use to push certain developments at all costs, if it radically undermines the life-quality of those whom it should serve. This mechanism at large explains why it is a bad decision simply to push forward production rates, without taking into account their effects on our environment, or its effects on small and large scale societal changes.

Any type of humanistic discipline, but especially literature, has an additional virtue: it provides us with a special understanding of others. Understanding isn't used here either its emotional meaning (as to forgive), nor in its scientific meaning (as to give a good causal explanation of it). Understanding in this sense means that we can see the motives for which others act, why those motives are important for them, why they resist forms of rationality that rely on values or reasoning that are external to theirs, and why certain people and groups cannot handle some problems. This sort of understanding can serve the role of disabling our animal instincts to react aggressively and hostile to anyone unknown, or belonging to a different group. Understanding disables our ability to condemn other people for things that stem from their being different from us.
Fostering this form of understanding does not mean - and as clever democrats and liberals know it never did - that one should accept evil, harm bringing means or the condemnation of virtues. A good liberal will stand up and try to show that she or he is right, and act accordingly. But that does not mean that she takes away the right of others to try and defend their views. Bad and faulty views fall, since questions of morality, conduct and norms aren't relative within a group. Nor are they relative on a general human level. (In relation to what would they be relative in the latter case?)
In connection to understanding consider literature for a moment: when one reads a book like Elfriede Jelinek's The Piano Teacher, the book takes about 10-16 hours to read, depending on your tempo, your imagination and level of tiredness. It tells the story of a single person - in the course of this it touches on other people, but all the way through, the protagonist is in the center. How often do you take the time and effort to pay attention to someone else for this amount of time? How often do you spend time on trying to figure out why and how it happened that one did just what one did? How often do you make so much effort to understand how someone's position in society makes them feel? Literature can enable us to do this.
Of course there are many different types of works, not all of them aim at giving us better understanding of others (some of them do not even aim at being entertaining, but for a good reason), some are just shallow forms of entertainment. There is not much wrong with fun, but those books are not the ones doing a lot of important work. The ones combining entertainment and enabling understanding are the great ones.

Also, a charge often brought against people studying humanities is, that many of them do not get jobs in their fields. Let us have a more careful look at this claim, and at why it is problematic.
1. What exactly does this mean? What percentage of people getting diplomas in humanities subjects do not get a job in their field? What's the percentage in law, in engineering, in economics, in management? One rarely sees such claims backed up by data.
2. Why is this a problem? A good training is not necessarily a vocational training. One can gain many skills, experiences and value without preparing for one given job. What sorts of skills can one obtain if one gets a decent humanities diploma with a decent result? A) one will be good at organizing large amounts of data quickly, B) learning new theoretical constructs quickly, C) use models to understand meaning, communication, social interactions better, D) communicate clearly.
3. If there are so many people getting humanities degrees that they cannot get jobs in their fields, why did the governments adopt a uniform and unrealistic support scheme for universities, where you get more money if you have more students? Obviously, this led the universities in every field to accept more and more people. Inevitably, the standards dropped. Since to do well in any field of the humanities appropriately one needs to be quite clever, it could easily be foreseen that the faculties will get lots of people who actually won't be able to do well in these subjects, and cannot get a job in this field with their diplomas. This is similar to the huge droup-out rates in informatics, maths or in other difficult fields.
4. Many people make the following mistake. They look at one or a few undergrad(s), someone who is at most average, or below that in his/her subject and conclude that the people studying in that field aren't studying anything useful, since they cannot give a clear account of what they will do, what their professors research, etc. Of course there is no field where, with the exception of a few outstanding students, young people could answer such questions well. They can give you textbook definitions. What can they tell you about the inner workings, the everyday, the many connections of their field to other social institutions? What can anyone without determination and aspiration tell you about such things? So, why not ask the best ones who have finished and have gotten jobs?
5. What exactly does it show that many people getting a diploma in the humanities do not settle for 'a job in the humanities'? It surely does not show that the overwhelming majority of them don't have the abilities, or knowledge to do so. There simply aren't too many jobs in the humanities. So, they work in all sorts of fields.
Where, you ask? At companies, at hospitals, for the government, as writers, and so on. Would it be better if all these jobs were filled by people with different diplomas? Is it so: the good and giving private sector would love to create more jobs, it is only that there wouldn't be enough people to fill them? No, this isn't the situation. And people with humanities diplomas are obviously capable of doing these jobs well.
But wait, couldn't they do these jobs just as well without their diploma? Well, it isn't sure that they could. Think of the following: people after leaving school with 16 or 18 aren't usually very reliable and disciplined. University gives them many skills in this. Even if at a humanities faculty you learn certain things not related to how a business is run, or a car constructed, you do not just read pulp. You have to exercise your capacities in many ways, figure out solutions to problems, prepare for exams, grasp difficult material, organize your life well and get through exams. All tests and experiences that strengthen the confidence and enable you to handle a job much better.

Also, let us not forget that most systems that are important in our lives, including moral, political, cultural systems (and by cultural I mean habits, forms of leisure and punishment, duties, all in all: forms of life) are not systems that emerge simply from the workings from underlying natural systems. Of course they are realized by such systems, but this does not mean that from the workings from the underlying systems we can understand the workings of the higher level systems. Anything in this world has an underlying natural realization. But this does not mean that the logic of a higher order system is always determined by the functioning of the lower one. Also, it does not mean that we can read off good suggestions on how to make a system work better by understanding natural systems.

Of course, no one clever is against cooperation between the humanities and sciences. Why would anyone be? Why wouldn't we use all the methods we have to discover interesting answers to interesting questions? The suggestion simply is, that the material of humanities is well worthwhile funding and studying, even working on it as a vocation, it can change lives, and thus it is valuable. At the same time when more and more people in the humanities understand how the sciences can be used to contribute to the pursuit of truth, the general public should understand why the humanities are doing just fine, doing good work and can solve many of their problems on their own. You just have to study them, before giving an opinion.

Plus: maybe it is not entirely fair to weigh this in, but most fields in humanities are still way more cheaper than research on sports cars, on far away galaxies, on new anti-depressants, on oil mining, etc. Many of these fields also receive large amounts of funding from the private sector. Although they contribute to economy and create jobs, taking into account their negative consequences - such as enforcing bad consumer choices, creating extra profit for already wealthy companies, pushing non-sustainable energy usage, etc. - is it sure that that's where government funding is best spent? Let's rather spend more on cancer research, Alzheimer's, good economic models, and research in ethics.